Iranian presidential elections: Is Masoud Pezeshkian truly a reformist?

The Iranian government claimed a 40 per cent participation rate in the first round and a voter turnout of 49.8 per cent in the second round. The truth is that, in recent times, there has been a decline in meaningful public engagement in elections in the country. In the parliamentary elections of 2019, the participation rate was reported at 42 per cent. Similarly, 41 per cent cast their votes in last year’s parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections. Nearly 77 per cent of the voters in the Iranian capital, Tehran, reportedly did not vote for the presidential candidates. An official vote count put Pezeshkian as the winner with 16.3 million ballots to Jalili’s 13.5 million.

The voter reaction is linked to the discontent with the economic and political situation in the country. Elections have had limited repercussions on the way Iranian politics operates. The President has limited powers. As the head of the government, the President merely spearheads the implementation of the broad political guidelines laid down by the Supreme Guide, the Head of State. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said a boycott campaign led by Iran’s “enemies” was defeated and Pezeshkian must now focus on improving the country and preserving the establishment. Iran’s allies have congratulated Pezeshkian, but Western leaders have been comparatively muted in their response.

The elections were hastily organised after the death of the conservative President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19. In the normal course, they would have taken place in 2025. The Raisi government’s failure to solve the Islamic Republic’s problems seems to have been a major cause for the disaffection. And if the voter turnout is any indication, only a small percentage of Iranians appear to believe that the new president could create short-term stability to prepare for the succession of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Pezeshkian’s first task would be to assure the Iranian theologians and the paramilitary that he is the right man to implement their decisions amidst the domestic crisis and rising tensions with Israel.

The most significant factor in Iran’s politics today is the civil disobedience in the country. Despite the establishment’s efforts to revive the old dichotomy between the ultra-conservative and moderate sections of the population, the bitter memories of the 2022 Mahsa Amini anti-government protests is still fresh among the younger generation of Iranians, who shape 65 to 70 per cent of the country’s population. One of the popular slogans on social media during the presidential elections was “Hard-liner, reformist, your time is up, the game is over”. The so-called “reformist”, Pezeshkian, played a key role in introducing the compulsory hijab for nurses and women patients in hospitals in the early years of the Islamic Revolution. According to several observers and analysts, Pezeshkian’s victory could help in posturing to the global audience — an attempt to ease the pressure from the West – but does not mean much in terms of real change.

The elections were overshadowed by the growing legitimacy crisis of Iran’s Islamic regime and the battle of succession for the 85-year-old Khamenei. Raisi’s untimely death did ignite a small power contest linked to the succession battle. But the Supreme Leader and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) managed to run the show to their advantage. The Supreme Leader and the IRGC head are trying to create an illusion that a “reformist” president would stand Tehran in good stead in its engagement with the West and maintain Iran’s hegemony in the Middle East. Only time will tell how long this Machiavellian game will last.

The writer is director, Mahatma Gandhi Centre for Nonviolence and Peace at OP Jindal Global University