Xi Jinping is subtler than Vladimir Putin—yet equally disruptive

Two years after Xi Jinping declared a “no limits” partnership with Vladimir Putin, and as the leaders meet again in Beijing on May 16th and 17th, the world is getting a good look at what China’s approach means in practice. It is not pretty. As we explain this week, Chinese firms are sustaining Mr Putin’s war in Ukraine by selling Russia items needed to make weapons. China’s coastguard is bullying vessels in the South China Sea, enforcing its bogus territorial claims. And China’s spies are allegedly meddling in Britain and elsewhere.

Mr Xi’s challenge to the world is more subtle than that posed by the warmongering Mr Putin. Yet it is still a problem. He craves a might-makes-right order, letting China do as it pleases. Its support for pariah states is meant to defy and divide the West, while avoiding a direct clash. Its “grey-zone coercion” in the South China Sea falls short of war, but is intended to weaken foes. China thinks these tactics can be sustained without tipping into conflict. The question for any country that supports global rules is how far to let Mr Xi go.

When it comes to Russia, China’s leader has already gone quite far. Mr Xi ignores Western pleas that he tone down his support for Mr Putin, viewing Russia as an indispensable partner in his campaign to dismantle the American-led order. The two countries have been deepening their military and trade ties. America, in turn, has been tightening sanctions, and imposing tariffs on China in other areas. Of most concern are Chinese components and machinery flowing to Russian arms manufacturers. Antony Blinken, America’s top diplomat, has said that Russia would struggle to carry on in Ukraine without China’s support. China is not a participant in the crisis, nor a party to it, bristles Mr Xi. But a long war that tests Western unity is to his advantage.

On the other side of the world, it is the risk of a conflict caused by China that worries America and its allies. The South China Sea is larger than the Mediterranean, but increasingly difficult to cross without encountering Chinese coastguard vessels doing dangerous things. Near two disputed shoals, Chinese guardsmen routinely blast Philippine vessels with water-cannons powerful enough to bend metal. Farther south, Chinese vessels harass Malaysian ships looking for oil and gas in Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone, waters that China calls its own.

The Philippines’ defence treaty with America turns Chinese bullying into a superpower stand-off. The stakes are as high over Taiwan, which is preparing to swear in Lai Ching-te as its new president on May 20th. China increasingly acts as if the island’s air and maritime boundaries do not exist. America and its allies have been preparing for the worst-case scenario: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But for now the bigger danger lies in the grey zone, where Chinese actions risk causing a spiral of escalation.

By design, China’s actions in Europe, Asia and elsewhere often lie between war and peace. A forceful response risks seeming like an over-reaction. Doing nothing, though, means ceding incremental gains to China. So the first task is for Western countries to expose China’s actions for what they are: a glimpse of the world order that Chinese leaders seek, in which no country cares, or dares, to challenge their power. Shining daylight on China helps avoid complacency. (Before the invasion of Ukraine, European states took too long to believe American warnings about Russia’s malign intentions.) And information can shift public opinion. Polls in some countries that are a target of China’s bullying suggest growing distrust.

That all makes a second task easier. America must stand by its allies, not as an act of charity, but because they are a superpower asset that China lacks. Relentless Chinese and Russian attempts to divide alliances, from NATO to America’s defence network in Asia, are a backhanded compliment. Autocrats respect strength, and there is strength in numbers.

Last, the West needs to exploit the fact that Mr Xi’s country has a stake in stability. China’s leader is not about to abandon Mr Putin. But unlike his Russian friend, he does not gain from chaos. Mr Blinken has credited China with persuading Russia not to use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Nor has China supplied it with lethal weapons. There are, in fact, limits to their relationship, just as there are lines that China seems reluctant to cross in the South China Sea. Naive dreams of changing China lie in the past: its every-country-for-itself worldview is all too clear. But Mr Xi’s calculating approach to the world is an opportunity, too. As China’s economy slows, it has an interest in avoiding a complete break with the West. The best way to temper Mr Xi’s aggression and grey-zone bullying is to show that it comes with costs.

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